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LITIGATING STATE INTERESTS:
ATTORNEYS GENERAL AS AMICI
MARGARET H. LEMOS† & KEVIN M. QUINN‡
An important strain of federalism scholarship locates the primary value of fed-
eralism in how it carves up the political landscape, allowing groups that are out of
power at the national level to flourish—and, significantly, to govern—in the states.
On that account, partisanship, rather than a commitment to state authority as such,
motivates state actors to act as checks on federal power. Our study examines par-
tisan motivation in one area where state actors can, and do, advocate on behalf of
state power: the Supreme Court. We compiled data on state amicus filings in
Supreme Court cases from the 1979–2013 Terms and linked it up with data on the
partisanship of state attorneys general (AGs). Focusing only on merits-stage briefs,
we looked at each AG’s partisan affiliation and the partisanship of the AGs who
either joined, or explicitly opposed, her briefs. If partisanship drives amicus
activity, then we should see a strong negative relationship between the partisanship
of AGs opposing each other and a strong positive relationship between those who
cosign briefs.
What we found was somewhat surprising. States agreed far more often than
they disagreed, and—until recently—most multistate briefs represented bipartisan,
not partisan, coalitions of AGs. Indeed, for the first twenty years of our study, the
cosigners of these briefs were generally indistinguishable from a random sampling
of AGs then in office. The picture changes after 2000, when the coalitions of
cosigners become decidedly more partisan, particularly among Republican AGs.
The partisanship picture is also different for the 6% of cases in which different
states square off in opposing briefs. In those cases, AGs do tend to join together in
partisan clusters. Here, too, the appearance of partisanship becomes stronger after
the mid-1990s.
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INTRODUCTION
Federalism law and theory assume that states are capable of
resisting, or checking, federal power. A state-level check is considered
“the principal benefit” of dividing power between the federal govern-
ment and the states.1 States’ checking capacity likewise plays a star-
ring role in the “political safeguards” theory of federalism, which
focuses not on why we should want a federal system but what it takes
to maintain one. According to that theory, states can resist federal
overreaching from within, manipulating the levers of the federal polit-
ical process so as “to defend state interests from undue
infringement.”2
It remains unclear, however, what motivates states to act as
checks. Critics of the political safeguards theory argue that, in their
efforts to appeal to voters, federal and state representatives may favor
measures that aggrandize federal power at the expense of the states.3
Federal representatives may prefer federal solutions to state problems
so that they can take credit for successful fixes, and state representa-
tives may welcome federal intervention if it means more funding for
popular initiatives or political cover for unpopular ones.4
1 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of the
federalist system is a check on abuses of government power. . . . [A] healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.”).
2 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For seminal works on the political safeguards theory, see generally JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175–84 (1980); Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 215 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954).
3 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARV. L. REV. 915, 940–41 (2005) (“[B]ecause political support will depend primarily on
policy outcomes rather than on the particular institution that delivers them, state and
federal officials will experience a predictable set of incentives working at cross-purposes
with any intrinsic interest in expanding the state and federal regulatory spheres.”).
4 See id. at 941 (“Federal regulation and spending obviously can, and often does,
benefit state-level constituencies. Consequently, state officials who are primarily interested
in maximizing political support will have no reliable interest in decreasing federal power
(or, the equivalent, in increasing state power).”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s
Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 74 (2004) (“[F]ederal representatives may have
preferences on substantive issues like environmental protection or gun control that reflect
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Underlying these critiques is a recognition that states comprise
collections of individuals and institutions with diverse and often con-
flicting interests. To paraphrase Kenneth Shepsle, each state is a
“they,” not an “it.”5 Different state actors may conceive of the state’s
interests in different ways. And the people who are in a position to
speak for the state qua state—to assert and defend its interests in the
federal political process—may have competing interests of their own.
If state actors often lack incentives to stand up for state interests,
what fuels federal-state conflict? One possible answer is partisan
politics. An important new strain in federalism scholarship locates the
primary value of federalism in how it carves up the political landscape,
allowing groups that are out of power at the national level to
flourish—and, significantly, to govern—in the states.6 On that
account, partisanship, rather than a commitment to state authority as
such, motivates state actors to act as checks on federal power.7
Our study examines partisan motivation in one area where state
actors can, and do, advocate on behalf of state power: the Supreme
Court. Acting through their attorneys general (AGs), states are
involved in many cases adjudicating the boundaries of state and fed-
eral authority. In some cases, states spearhead the litigation as parties,
as they did in the recent constitutional challenge to the Affordable
Care Act.8 In other instances, states participate as amici on behalf of
other states or private parties.9 They are aided by the fact that, under
the geographically concentrated views of their constituents, but they will have little reason
to want those issues to be decided at the state level.”).
5 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
6 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077,
1080–81 (2014) (“[O]ur contemporary federal system generates a check on the federal
government and fosters divided citizen loyalties, as courts and scholars frequently assume.
But it does so for an unexplored reason—because it provides durable and robust
scaffolding for partisan conflict.”); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17 (2010) (“Even the variants of federalism most closely tied
to sovereignty . . . can function if political competition is robust, as the political party out of
national power will use whatever local weapons it possesses to challenge its rival.”); see
also Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1783 (2005)
(“[F]ederalism can be understood at least in part as a strategy for allowing would-be
dissenters to govern in some subpart of a system.”).
7 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 6; see also infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text
(discussing Bulman-Pozen’s account of partisan federalism in more detail).
8 Pete Williams, State Attorneys General Sue over Health Bill, NBC NEWS (Mar. 23,
2010, 7:44 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36001783/ns/politics-health_care_reform/#.
VkqviktjoWw (“The ink is still drying on the health care overhaul bill signed into law
Tuesday by President Barack Obama, but attorneys general from at least 14 states have
filed lawsuits to challenge the legislation.”).
9 See infra Part I (describing other studies of state amicus activity).
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the Supreme Court’s rules, state AGs may file amicus briefs without
obtaining the consent of the parties or the permission of the Court.10
Indeed, a new crop of AGs—most of them Republicans—trum-
pets litigation as a means of defending state interests against federal
encroachment. For example, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott
made news a few years ago by telling supporters that his job descrip-
tion is simple: “I go into the office,” he said. “I sue the federal govern-
ment and I go home.”11 Abbott was true to his words. According to
news reports, he sued the Obama Administration at least twenty-
seven times in five years.12
Litigation by state AGs is not reserved for challenges to federal
law, of course. States also participate in cases concerning burdensome
regulations by other states or limitations on state power that stem
from the Bill of Rights or the Reconstruction Amendments.13 In these
cases, too, state AGs use the concept of state interests to ground legal
arguments about the appropriate scope and meaning of federal law.14
There is reason to believe, moreover, that AGs’ efforts on behalf
of their states are consequential. As we elaborate below, states are
some of the most successful litigants before the Supreme Court.15 And
prior empirical work suggests that the filing of state AG amicus briefs
in the Supreme Court corresponds with higher rates of success for the
10 SUP. CT. R. 37.4 (exempting the U.S. Solicitor General, federal agencies, state
attorneys general (AGs), and “authorized law officer[s]” of cities, counties, towns, or
similar entities from the requirement of a motion for leave to file an amicus brief).
11 Sue Owen, Greg Abbott Says He Has Sued Obama Administration 25 Times, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN (May 10, 2013, 5:14 PM), http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/
2013/may/10/greg-abbott/greg-abbott-says-he-has-sued-obama-administration-/. Other
AGs describe their jobs in similar terms of “stand[ing] up . . . to Washington and say[ing]
‘enough,’” “assert[ing] those [10th Amendment] rights,” and so on. Republican Att’ys
Gen. Assoc., Republican Attorneys General: States’ Rights, YOUTUBE (Jan. 22, 2014), http:/
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=WCgh-tbG4S4; see also Michael D. Shear, G.O.P. Turns to
the Courts to Aid Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2015, at A1 (noting the role of AGs in
various state-led suits against Obama-Administration initiatives).
12 Catalina Camia, GOP Attorneys General Push Back on Obama’s Executive Actions,
USA TODAY: ON POLITICS (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:09 PM), http://onpolitics.usatoday.com/2014/
01/28/gop-attorneys-general-push-back-on-obamas-executive-actions/.
13 See infra Part II.C.2 (describing cases).
14 Compare Brief of Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
1, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 840014 (supporting
a constitutional challenge to California’s ban on same sex marriage and explaining that
“[a]s States, the Amici have a strong interest in ensuring that citizens have equal
opportunity to participate in civil society”), with Brief Addressing the Merits of the States
of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 1, Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 416198 (“The Amici States have interests in
(1) protecting their ability to define and regulate marriage, and (2) preserving the integrity
of their constitutions and democratic processes.”).
15 Infra Part I.
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party supported by those briefs.16 Scholars suggest that state AG
briefs can, at a minimum, serve a signaling function for the Court,
alerting the Justices to federal laws and regulations (or, in the case of
the dormant Commerce Clause, other states’ laws) that trench on
important state interests.17
But there is a complication: Contrary to what one might expect,
states’ briefs do not always push for more state autonomy and less
federal (or interstate) meddling. State AGs sometimes defend federal
laws against enumerated-powers challenges, defend other states’ laws
against dormant Commerce Clause challenges, take the side of claim-
ants who invoke federal constitutional rights against state power, or
argue in favor of preemption of state law.18 Nor is it unheard of for
states to appear on both sides of cases before the Court.19 Such cases
support the hypothesis that AG advocacy might be driven in large part
by partisanship, rather than fealty to the abstract interests of the state
qua state.
To test the role of partisanship in AG advocacy, we compiled data
on state amicus filings in Supreme Court cases from the 1979–2013
Terms and linked it up with data on the partisanship of state AGs.
Attorneys general in forty-three states are popularly elected,20 and
many aspire to higher office.21 We wanted to know: To what extent,
and in what ways, is AG partisanship reflected in the positions the
states take before the Supreme Court? Focusing only on merits-stage
briefs, we looked at each AG’s partisan affiliation and the partisanship
of the AGs who either joined, or explicitly opposed, her briefs. If par-
16 Infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State
and Local Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 233
(1999) (studying dormant Commerce Clause cases decided from 1970 to 1997 and arguing
that the Court uses state amici as “fire alarms” that call attention to state regulations that
burden interstate commerce); Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the
Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 64–66,
69–72 (2006) (arguing that state amicus filings serve a signaling function for the Justices in
preemption cases).
18 See Michael E. Solomine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of
Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 366 (2012) (highlighting “those instances where a
large number of SAGs file amicus briefs, often jointly, that take a position against the
presumed state interest in a federalism dispute and when the Justices appear to take special
note of that incongruence when rendering that decision”).
19 See infra Part II.B (reporting on the proportion of cases in which states file
competing amicus briefs on the merits).
20 William P. Marshall, Break up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006) (citing
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 268 (2005)).
21 See id. at 2453 (“[T]he Office of the Attorney General has long been seen by many
of its occupants as a stepping stone to the Governor’s office . . . .”).
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tisanship drives amicus activity, then we should see a strong negative
relationship between the partisanship of AGs opposing each other and
a strong positive relationship between those who cosign briefs.
To our surprise, we found relatively low rates of interstate conflict
in our set of state amicus briefs. States agreed far more often than
they disagreed, and—until recently—most multistate briefs repre-
sented bipartisan, not partisan, coalitions of AGs. In about 94% of the
cases in which any state wrote a merits brief, there was no explicit
disagreement among the state AGs. Further, for the first twenty years
of our study, the cosigners of these briefs were generally indistinguish-
able from a random sampling of AGs then in office. The picture
changes after 2000, when the coalitions of cosigners become decidedly
more partisan, particularly among Republican AGs.
The partisanship picture is also different for the 6% of cases in
which different states square off in opposing briefs. In those cases,
AGs do tend to join together in partisan clusters. Here, too, the
appearance of partisanship becomes stronger after the mid-1990s.
Our findings are broadly consistent with theories of “partisan fed-
eralism,” but the nuanced patterns we uncover highlight the need for
further theorizing, and empirical study, about the complex forces that
inspire state officials to act. For example, we find notable differences
between Democratic and Republican AGs, with Republican AGs
increasingly joining together in partisan coalitions in cases in which
Democrats do not participate at all. Meanwhile, some Democratic
AGs—particularly those from western and southern states—have
begun behaving more like Republicans. And, though AG coalitions
have become markedly more partisan in recent years, the prevalence
of bipartisan coalitions remains striking. Partisanship certainly plays
some role in explaining AGs’ advocacy on behalf of the states—it
would be remarkable if it did not—but plainly it is not the full story.
Why do we see so much more partisanship in recent decades?
Though we suspect that the shift in AG amicus activity reflects
broader trends toward political polarization, that is not a complete
answer. Are we observing evidence that AGs themselves are more
polarized, leaving less room for agreement between those on the left
and those on the right? Or are AGs simply channeling the increasingly
polarized politics of their states? Put differently, to the extent that
partisanship inspires state officials to assert state interests, whose par-
tisanship matters?
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These questions underscore the importance of disaggregating dif-
ferent kinds of state actors and different kinds of state action.22
Although most AGs are elected, and all must be political creatures to
some extent, they are also legal officers. Their job is to represent the
interests of their clients—the states—and in many cases those inter-
ests will be grounded in state laws and policies that the AGs them-
selves do not control. The effects of partisanship may therefore be
more muted for AGs than for, say, state governors. If that is correct,
then the recent surge in partisan briefing might also reflect the trend
toward one-party rule in the states.23
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview
of existing research into the causes and effects of state AG advocacy
before the Supreme Court. Part II describes our research design and
our findings. Part III discusses the implications of our research and
outlines avenues for further study.
I
STATES BEFORE THE BAR: BACKGROUND AND EXISTING
RESEARCH
States today are some of the most active litigants in the Supreme
Court. As a group, their participation both as direct parties and as
amici is second only to that of the U.S. Government.24 States also can
boast impressive success rates. For example, a study of state petitions
for certiorari filed during the 2001–2009 Terms reported that “the
states enjoyed remarkable success obtaining review, with 21.9% of
their petitions being granted compared to a 4.2% success rate for all
paid petitions during the sample period.”25 A 1999 study concluded
22 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State
and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1999)
(“In discussions about American federalism, it is common to speak of a ‘state government’
as if it were a black box, an individual speaking with a single voice. . . . [A] ‘state’ actually
incorporates a bundle of different subdivisions, branches, and agencies.”).
23 Infra note 151.
24 Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General
as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 533 (1994); Cornell W. Clayton & Jack
McGuire, State Litigation Strategies and Policymaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 17 (2001); Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme Court:
State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae, 70 JUDICATURE 298, 299 (1987); Douglas Ross,
Safeguarding Our Federalism: Lessons for the States from the Supreme Court, 45 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 723, 727 (1985).
25 Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, State Coordinating Institutions and Agenda
Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 AM. POL. RES. 819, 826 (2012).
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that, on the merits, “states are more successful than any other litigator
save the United States.”26
States’ Supreme Court activism is of relatively recent vintage.
Prior to the 1980s, most state AG offices were small, sleepy outposts.27
Things changed dramatically over the next few decades. The “New
Federalism” of the Reagan Administration resulted in the devolution
of countless regulatory and administrative responsibilities from the
federal government to the states.28 As the workload of state agencies
increased, so too did their litigation exposure—with the burden of
defense falling on state AGs. Matters heated up on offense as well. As
federal agencies decreased their enforcement activities, state-level
enforcers rushed in to fill the void.29 Areas like antitrust and con-
sumer protection, once dominated by the federal government, became
enclaves of aggressive state enforcement.30
Recognizing their AGs’ significant new responsibilities, states
allocated more resources to them.31 Higher budgets and greater
responsibilities, in turn, drew a new breed of attorney to the AG’s
office. Increasingly, the “state’s law firm” was staffed with “a younger,
better educated, and more ambitious caliber of attorney.”32
Yet the increased stature of state AGs did not translate immedi-
ately into success at the bar—particularly in the federal courts, and
even more particularly in the Supreme Court, where states must vie
against attorneys experienced in the specialized art of Supreme Court
26 ERIC N. WALTENBURG & BILL SWINFORD, LITIGATING FEDERALISM: THE STATES
BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 77 (1999).
27 See Clayton, supra note 24, at 538 (describing AGs’ offices as “placid and reactive”
prior to 1980); Morris, supra note 24, at 299 (“[S]tate attorneys general tended to look
upon their role as being merely ministerial functionaries of the state administration; they
were in office to do the bidding of other political executives and defend the state
establishment from legal attacks.”). In 1950 the average AG’s office had a staff of roughly
nineteen attorneys; the median budget hovered just under $104,000. WALTENBURG &
SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 45. By 1970, the average staff had grown to fifty-one, and the
median budget to $612,089. Id.
28 Id.
29 See William L. Webster, Lecture, The Emerging Role of State Attorneys General and
the New Federalism, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 5 (1990) (“In short order the states asserted
themselves in dramatic fashion. . . . Attorneys general were called ‘fifty regulatory
Rambos’ by one individual.”).
30 Id.; see also Clayton, supra note 24, at 535–36 (describing states’ efforts to secure
regulatory and enforcement authority in areas including antitrust and consumer
protection).
31 During the 1970s and early 1980s, AGs’ budgets expanded at rates that outpaced
general government spending in every state. Clayton & McGuire, supra note 24, at 18. By
1989, the mean number of attorneys was more than 148, and the median budget $9.9
million. WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 45.
32 Clayton, supra note 24, at 538.
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advocacy.33 Speaking to the Fifth Circuit’s Judicial Conference in
1974, Justice Powell observed that “[s]ome of the weakest briefs and
arguments come from [the states as] representatives of the public
interest.”34 That same year, Chief Justice Burger proposed appointing
amicus curiae for California in order to “begin our drive to force the
States to abandon their on-the-job training of their lawyers in this
Court.”35 Other federal judges expressed similar views, as did other
attorneys.36
Juxtaposed against the mounting resources and responsibilities of
AGs, this crescendo of criticism spurred several institutional responses
designed to improve the effectiveness of AG advocacy.37 The most
significant was the 1982 creation of the National Association of Attor-
neys General (NAAG) Supreme Court Project.38 The Project (now
known as the Center for Supreme Court Advocacy) helps coordinate
state litigation efforts, and provides various forms of support
(including organizing moot arguments and the like) for AGs with
cases before the Court.39
33 On the increasing specialization of the Supreme Court bar, see generally Richard J.
Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court
by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008).
34 Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Address at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference (May 27,
1974).
35 Goelzhauser & Vouvalis, supra note 25, at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 For example, state and local government lawyers earned dismal scores from federal
judges in a 1978 study of the caliber of advocacy in the federal courts, ranking well below
both private practitioners representing individuals and appointed counsel in criminal
appeals. WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 44 (citing ANTHONY PARTRIDGE &
GORDON BERMANT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS: A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
69 tbl.43 (1978)). Fifty-seven percent of the judges surveyed reported that advocacy by
state and local attorneys was a “serious problem.” Id. And, in a study of attorneys who
argued cases before the Supreme Court between 1977 and 1982, only 4% of state and local
government lawyers were considered to be “experts” by their peers. Id. (citing KEVIN T.
MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY
155 tbl.7.4 (1993)).
37 Another impetus for the new coordination were several decisions in the early 1980s
broadly construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Stewart A. Baker & James R. Asperger,
Foreword: Toward a Center for State and Local Legal Advocacy, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 367,
371 (1982) (discussing the elimination of the “good faith” defense in Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), and the expansion of § 1983 enforcement powers in
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)).
38 See Ross, supra note 24, at 727–28 (describing National Association of Attorneys
General’s (NAAG) genesis and functions). Another significant institutional response was
the creation of the State and Local Legal Center (SLLC), which files amicus briefs on
behalf of member associations. Id. at 728.
39 See NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy, NAT’L ASSOC. OF ATT’YS GEN.,
http://www.naag.org/naag/about_naag/center-supreme-court.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2015)
(describing the Center’s functions); Clayton & McGuire, supra note 24, at 23–25 (same).
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Not surprisingly, the number of Supreme Court cases involving
states as parties, particularly as petitioners, shot up in the years that
followed.40 Even more notable is the increase in states’ filings as
amici. Such filings are not command performances, but represent
AGs’ discretionary decisions to devote limited resources to Supreme
Court advocacy.41 The most comprehensive study of state litigation in
the Supreme Court, a book-length treatment by Eric Waltenburg and
Bill Swinford, reports that by 1989 states had “become exceptionally
active amicus curiae participants. They account[ed] for 20 percent of
all certiorari petitions accompanied by an amicus brief and 18 percent
of the amicus briefs on the merits.”42
If anything, the number of state briefs filed understates the level
of state activity. Thanks in large part to NAAG’s coordination efforts,
states frequently band together on amicus briefs. Although NAAG
initially encouraged states to file multiple briefs supporting each other
in the same case, “by the late 1980s, NAAG’s strategy began to shift
away from a coalitional strategy toward a joining strategy, in which
states are encouraged to sign onto a single brief rather than filing mul-
tiple individual briefs.”43 The effects are palpable. A study of merits-
stage state amicus briefs found that the average number of joining
states jumped from 2.4 in the 1970s to 13.9 in the 1990s.44 A more
recent study reveals similar joining behavior at the certiorari stage:
Using data on state certiorari filings compiled by Dan Schweitzer at
NAAG, Greg Goelzhauser and Nicole Vouvalis report that “[d]uring
40 Several studies examine state litigation in the Supreme Court between 1953 and 1989
(the dates covered by Phase I of the Supreme Court Judicial Database). Focusing on cases
in which state and local governments participated as direct parties during that period,
Richard Kearney and Reginald Sheehan found that appearances “have trended upward,
from a low of 20 cases in 1955 to a high of nearly 140 cases in 1986.” Richard C. Kearney &
Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Decision Making: The Impact of Court Composition
on State and Local Government Litigation, 54 J. POL. 1008, 1011 (1992). Similarly,
Waltenburg and Swinford found that “there has been an appreciable increase in state
participation before the Court as [petitioners]—more than one case per term” from 1954 to
1989. WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 62.
41 See Clayton, supra note 24, at 544 (“Unlike when states are party to a suit, the
decision to participate as amicus curiae is determined largely by the personal interests and
felt political pressures on individual attorneys general. Changes in the institutional role of
the office should therefore be reflected by trends in state amicus activity.”).
42 WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 48; see also Morris, supra note 24, at
302 (“Prior to the 1970 term, the total number of cases attracting state amici had never
exceeded 15. . . . [T]he total number of cases for the 1980 through 1983 terms has never
been fewer than 25 . . . .”).
43 Clayton & McGuire, supra note 24, at 23–24.
44 Id. at 24–25; see also WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 48 (“NAAG’s
focus on the coordination of state amicus activity has resulted in substantial levels of
joining behavior. Accordingly, where it is rare to find more than two amici joining together
on a pre-certiorari amicus brief, on average six states coalesce . . . .”).
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the 2001–2009 terms, state-sponsored amicus briefs urging review in
state-filed cases were joined by an average of about 18 states, and only
5 of the 88 briefs filed were signed by a single state.”45
We know that states are active as amici, but do their briefs make
a difference? Interviews with former Supreme Court clerks suggest
that the Justices and their clerks pay close attention to amicus briefs
filed by state AGs.46 As one clerk put it, “there is an institutional
interest in taking state concerns seriously because of federalism
concerns.”47
Quantitative research paints a similar picture of the effects of
states’ efforts as amici. Focusing on the 1953–1989 Terms and control-
ling for other factors that might affect the decision on certiorari,
Waltenburg & Swinford found that the probability of a grant
increased substantially when a group of states submitted a certiorari-
stage brief, but not when an individual state weighed in as amicus.48
Goelzhauser and Vouvalis’s study of state certiorari petitions from the
2001–2009 Terms likewise suggests that states can amplify their influ-
ence by banding together.49 The authors reason that state amicus sup-
port, particularly if widespread, sends “a more credible signal [than a
petition alone] that the case impacts not only the filing state’s inter-
ests, but those of other states as well.”50
Notably, subsequent work by Goelzhauser and Vouvalis suggests
that not all state groups are created equal: The composition of the
group matters, at least at the certiorari stage. Examining an expanded
sample of state certiorari petitions from the 2001–2010 Terms and
measuring state government ideology using the approach of William
Berry and his coauthors,51 Goelzhauser and Vouvalis found that “peti-
tions accompanied by a state-filed amicus brief are more likely to be
granted as the preference heterogeneity of the state lobbying coalition
45 Goelzhauser & Vouvalis, supra note 25, at 825.
46 See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus
Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 48 (2004) (“Following the solicitor general, amicus briefs
filed by states were the next most frequently cited government entity as being important
enough to always warrant close consideration.”).
47 Id.
48 WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 75 (controlling for the presence of the
Solicitor General, conflict (and alleged conflict) among the lower courts, civil liberties
issues, and a nonstate amicus).
49 Goelzhauser & Vouvalis, supra note 25, at 831.
50 Id. at 824.
51 William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American
States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 329–31 (1998) (measuring the ideology of a state’s
citizens and political leaders using a range of information, including the roll-call voting
scores of congressional delegations, the outcomes of congressional elections, the partisan
division of state legislatures, and the party of the governor).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-4\NYU407.txt unknown Seq: 12  2-OCT-15 14:01
1240 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1229
increases.”52 Heterogeneous coalitions, they hypothesized, may be
better able to convey credible signals of case importance to the
Court.53
So much for the certiorari stage; what about the merits? Here the
evidence is more spotty.54 The few studies that focus on the effect of
state amicus briefs at the merits stage suggest that state advocacy does
make a difference—at least some of the time. Richard Kearney and
Thomas Merrill examined cases decided between 1946 and 1995 in an
effort to tease out the effects of various categories of amici, including
states. They found that state amici had a positive, and statistically sig-
nificant, impact on the success rates of the respondents they sup-
ported, but no equivalent impact when they appeared on behalf of
petitioners.55 Other studies have examined states’ impact in particular
issue areas.56 For example, Sean Nicholson-Crotty focused on feder-
alism cases from 1953 to 1986 and found that “it made little or no
difference in the federalism outcome if a single state filed an amicus
brief in support of state power.”57 But his findings did suggest that the
52 Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, Amicus Coalition Heterogeneity and Signaling
Credibility in Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 45 PUBLIUS 99, 100 (2014).
53 Id. at 102.
54 A handful of studies have examined states’ overall success rates without attempting
to measure the impact of states’ advocacy as amici, and have found that states enjoyed
significantly enhanced success rates through the 1970s and 1980s. See WALTENBURG &
SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 84 (“During the Warren Court the states’ average success rate
was 35.4 percent. Since 1970 that has improved to 53 percent.”); Kearney & Sheehan, supra
note 40, at 1013 (finding that the success rate for state and local governments as parties
“leaped from 36.7% during the Warren Court to more than 61% during the Burger/
Rehnquist Court, making them the second-best performing category of litigants”—bested
only by the federal government). Cornell W. Clayton and Jack McGuire found a similar
upward trajectory in states’ successes as amici during the 1970s and 1980s, though the trend
turned downward from 1990 to 1994. See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 24, at 26–27
(describing the trends in state advocacy between 1960 and 1995). The authors hypothesize
that the reversal of fortune might be due to the increased “amicus activity of other groups,
particularly those opposed to the exercise of state authority . . . .” Id. at 27. Alternatively,
states may have become “less selective in making appeals to the Court [given their earlier
successes], whereas their opponents bec[a]me more so.” Id.
55 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 809–10 (2000) (noting that when “States file
amicus briefs supporting the petitioner, and no State appears as a different kind of amicus,
they . . . secur[e] a [petitioner win] rate about 5% higher than the benchmark rate [of
success for petitioners in cases sans amici]. . . . [T]he respondents supported by States have
bettered the benchmark rate by nearly 9%”—a statistically significant improvement).
56 See, e.g., Douglas Ross & Michael W. Catalano, How State and Local Governments
Fared in the United States Supreme Court for the Past Five Terms, 20 URB. LAW. 341 (1988)
(examining criminal procedure cases over five years and finding that state litigants are
more likely to win when other states filed amicus briefs supporting their position on the
merits).
57 Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Note, State Merit Amicus Participation and Federalism
Outcomes in the U.S. Supreme Court, 37 PUBLIUS 599, 605 (2007). The category of
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presence of multiple state briefs “has a positive and significant impact
on the likelihood that the Court will support state rather than national
or shared power.”58 The same was true of a single brief signed by mul-
tiple states.59 By contrast, the Court ruled against state power in every
case in which at least one state filed a brief supporting the “national
power” outcome.60
In sum, the available evidence—while far from conclusive—sug-
gests that state amicus activity has had an impact on the Court’s deci-
sions on certiorari and on the merits. Yet states’ participation is not
uniform, nor are the positions states advocate.61 Importantly for pre-
sent purposes, existing research indicates that AGs from different
states increasingly articulate opposing interests. Writing in 1987,
Thomas Morris reported that states appeared on opposite sides of
only 2% of the cases argued before the Supreme Court.62 Such find-
ings reinforced the view that the political developments of the 1980s
and early 1990s “helped forge a new sense of shared interest between
the states in each others’ legal policymaking and litigation. . . . [N]ot
only have state attorneys general become more active, they have
increasingly sought to influence policy qua states in the collective
sense rather than as individual state actors.”63
That sense of shared interest may have eroded in recent years,
however. A new study by Paul Nolette finds significantly more inter-
state conflict, particularly during the Obama Administration. Focusing
on cases decided between 1993 and 2013, Nolette examined instances
in which multiple AGs filed briefs, either as amici or parties, at the
certiorari or merits stage. He found a “large spike” in interstate con-
“federalism cases” consists of cases so classified in Phase II of the Supreme Court Judicial
Database, yielding “593 formally decided cases where state versus national power was a
major value reflected in the majority opinion.” Id. at 603.
58 Id. at 608.
59 See id. at 605–08 (discussing court trends in cases with the support of multiple states
on a single brief).
60 See id. (“In those cases where states filed briefs supporting national power, the
outcome reflected that value 100 percent of the time.”).
61 For example, some states file, and join, far more amicus briefs than others. See, e.g.,
Morris, supra note 24, at 304 (finding variation among the states in the level of amicus
activity between 1974 and 1983, with California and New York leading the pack);
WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 66 (finding the nation’s most populous
states tend to be most active as parties, whereas states that are less populous but “rich in
natural resources and/or containing large tracts of land area owned by the federal
government” tended to be the most active amici).
62 Morris, supra note 24, at 302 (“Most of the divisions did not consist of a significant
number of states on either side, but rather one or two states on either side or one or two
dissenters from an otherwise large number of states.”). Not surprisingly, Morris found that
dormant Commerce Clause cases were the most common sites of interstate conflict. Id.
63 Clayton, supra note 24, at 539.
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flicts during the last four years of the sample.64 In 35% of the cases
during that period, states either squared off against each other or col-
laborated on briefs with a strong partisan slant—defined as those in
which Republican or Democratic AGs constituted at least 80% of par-
ticipating AGs.65
Nolette’s study represents a rare effort to examine the partisan
dimension of state amicus briefing.66 Our project picks up on similar
themes. Like Nolette, we are interested in the rate of interstate agree-
ment and conflict, and, specifically, the relationship between the
amicus joining and opposition behavior of AGs and their partisanship.
Though some of our findings are similar, our methodology is different.
In the next Part, we describe our research design and conclusions.
II
RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS
A. Data Collection
The starting point for our analysis is the set of amicus brief
headers gathered by Alexandra Dunworth, Joshua Fischman, and
Daniel Ho.67 These authors collected all headers of amicus briefs from
64 Paul Nolette, State Litigation During the Obama Administration: Diverging Agendas
in an Era of Polarized Politics, 44 PUBLIUS 451, 456 (2014).
65 Id. at 455–56, 457 tbl.1.
66 Another new—and, as yet, unpublished—study takes up the partisanship question in
the specific context of federalism cases. Sarah Esty, a Yale Law School student, examined
state amicus and certiorari briefs from the 2004–2005 and 2012–2013 Terms, focusing on
cases that implicated state-federal relations. Sarah Esty, State Federalism Preferences
Under Bush and Obama: An Empirical Assessment of Partisan Federalism (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the New York University Law Review). She coded each brief as
liberal or conservative using the Supreme Court Database issue direction coding, and as
pro- or anti-federalism based on “whether [the brief] called for greater state or federal
control over laws, courts, or agencies.” Id. at 7. Esty also separately coded each state’s
partisan identity based on presidential vote share, governor’s party, and Attorney
General’s party. Id. at 8. She found that 16% of state briefs advanced an anti-federalism
(pro-federal government) position. Id. at 11. Esty concluded, moreover, that states were
more likely to support federal power when doing so tracked the “state’s ideological
preferences. Almost two-thirds of the time (62%) that Democratic states advocated anti-
federalism positions, they did so to promote a liberal policy outcome . . . . When
Republican states urged anti-federalism results, over three quarters of the time (77%) it
was in service of achieving a conservative outcome . . . .” Id. at 16 (footnote omitted). For
Esty, those results “suggest a strong empirical basis for partisan federalism . . . .” Id. at 20.
Yet her data also suggest that a state’s assertion of pro- or anti-federalism results does not
follow directly from the state’s (or its AG’s) political orientation as compared to that of the
President. As Esty explains, “[a]nti-Obama states were not statistically significantly more
likely to take a pro-federalism stance than pro-Obama states.” Id. at 17.
67 Alexandra Dunworth, Joshua Fischman & Daniel E. Ho, Policy Voting: What Amici
Tell Us About Law (Oct. 30, 2009) (working paper), available at http://dho.stanford.edu/
research/amici.pdf.
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the 1978–2006 Terms using the Lexis Supreme Court Briefs
database.68 We followed a similar procedure to collect amicus briefs
from the 2007–2013 Terms.
These raw data contain both certiorari briefs and merits briefs. In
order to select just the merits briefs from states, we applied a series of
regular expressions to the brief headers to test for the inclusion of
specific language, such as whether a state name appeared in the
header; whether the words “amicus,” “amici,” or “curiae” appeared in
the header; whether a merits position was advanced; and whether par-
ticular state and local interest groups were listed in the header. Our
first pass through the data merely noted whether such language was
present in each header and recorded the results.
Our next data processing step involved taking the output from
step one and limiting our attention to the set of briefs that include a
state name or a state and local interest group name, the terms
“amicus,” “amici,” or “curiae,” and language consistent with a merits
position being advanced. Given that our goal is to find and code the
merits briefs of states, this is an overinclusive list.
We then engaged in computer-assisted coding of this overinclu-
sive set of cases. We did this by creating a computer program written
in the Python language that walked through each case in the list. For
each case, the program made initial coding decisions for several key
variables, such as which states or groups signed the brief, which party
the brief supported, and what the docket number was. These initial
computer codings were displayed on the computer screen through a
graphical user interface that also displayed the text of the brief
header. One of the authors then reviewed the computer-generated
codings for each brief, making corrections where necessary. Finally,
we screened for any remaining certiorari briefs by looking for multiple
briefs from similar collections of cosigners in the same case. There was
relatively little data from 1979, so we focused our attention on data
from the 1980 Term through the 2013 Term. This resulted in a dataset
of 989 state merits briefs. Throughout the remainder of this Article,
we will use the terms “brief” and “amicus brief” to refer to amicus
briefs on the merits—not certiorari briefs.
B. Preliminary Data Analysis and Observations
A threshold question, as reflected in existing studies of state liti-
gation activity, is how frequently do states participate as amici? Relat-
edly, we might wonder whether this level of activity has changed over
time. Figure 1 plots the total number of Supreme Court cases that had
68 For the details of their raw data collection, see id. at app. A, at 38.
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at least one state-signed amicus brief by Term. While there has been
some year-to-year variability, the number of cases with state amici has
not trended strongly either way from the 1980 Term to the 2013 Term.
The average number of cases with state amici is about twenty, with a
high of thirty-four cases per Term and a low of eleven. The surge
noted in earlier studies based on pre-1989 data seems to have abated,
with state amicus activity leveling off in more recent decades. It is
important to note, however, that these steady numbers of cases with
state amici are occurring during a time when the numbers of merits
decisions reached by the Court have been declining. For instance,
according to data from the Supreme Court Database, there were 128
merits decisions in the 1980 Term69 while there were sixty-nine merits
decisions in the 2013 Term.70 Thus, the fraction of cases with states as
amici was actually increasing during this time period.
FIGURE 1. SUPREME COURT CASES PER TERM WITH AT LEAST ONE






























































Notes: The y-axis gives the number of cases that had at least one merits-stage amicus brief signed
by a state AG.
69 Analysis Specifications, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
analysis.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (search “Range of Terms” for “1980 to 1980” and
“Decision Type” for “judgment of the court (orally argued),” “opinion of the court (orally
argued),” and “per curiam (orally argued)”).
70 Id. (search “Range of Terms” for “2013 to 2013” and “Decision Type” for “judgment
of the court (orally argued),” “opinion of the court (orally argued),” and “per curiam
(orally argued)”).
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We are also interested in how often the positions advocated by
the states are explicitly opposed by other states in other amicus briefs.
Figure 2 plots the number of cases with state amicus briefs in which no
state filed an opposing brief. Figure 3 plots the number (and, in the
lower plot, the fraction) of cases with state amicus briefs that featured
competing state briefs taking different positions on the merits. It
reveals that explicit disagreement among state amici is relatively
rare—typically occurring in less than five cases per Term, and occa-
sionally never occurring in a given Term.71 Over the full time period,
we found interstate conflict in just over 6% of cases in which any state
filed an amicus brief—although in some individual Terms this per-
centage is appreciably higher.
FIGURE 2. SUPREME COURT CASES PER TERM WITH AMICUS BRIEF





































































Notes: The y-axis gives the number of cases that had at least one merits-stage amicus brief signed
by a state AG and in which no other states signed briefs supporting the opposing party.
71 To ensure that we were not missing cases of interstate conflict by focusing exclusively
on amicus briefs, we also looked for conflicts between state amicus briefs and briefs filed
by states as parties. We found nine such cases in our dataset that were not already captured
by our search for explicit disagreement among state amici. Including the party-amicus
conflicts in our analysis did not change the results, so we have omitted them for the sake of
clarity.
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FIGURE 3. SUPREME COURT CASES PER TERM WITH AMICUS BRIEF

















































































































































Notes: In the top panel, the y-axis gives the number of cases that had merits-stage amicus briefs
signed by state AGs in which states took divergent merits positions. The bottom panel expresses
the numbers from the top panel as a fraction of the number of cases with at least one state-
signed amicus brief in each term.
What issues are at stake in the cases in which states participate as
amici? To get a sense of this, we used the fourteen category “issue
area codes” from the Supreme Court Database.72 While there has
72 THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 69.
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been some criticism of these issue codes,73 they provide a glimpse of
what is at stake in the various cases. Figure 4 displays the relative
frequency of briefs in each of the fourteen issue areas, both for all
state briefs and for cases in which there is conflict among state amici.
What we see is that economic activity is the most common issue cate-
gory both for all briefs and for briefs with explicit state opposition.
But states are active in a variety of other categories as well, including
federalism, civil rights, judicial power, first amendment, and, within
the “all-briefs” subplot, criminal procedure and due process. This
broad pattern suggests to us that, unsurprisingly, AGs are asserting a
variety of interests on behalf of their states—not just the abstract
institutional interests typically at issue in debates over federalism, but
a range of regulatory interests as well.
FIGURE 4. FREQUENCY OF SUPREME COURT DATABASE ISSUES












































































































































































































































State Briefs with Opposition
Notes:  The left panel displays the number of state-signed amicus briefs on each of the fourteen
categories of Supreme Court Database issues from the 1980 to 2013 Terms. The right panel
displays similar numbers but only for state amicus briefs in which at least one other state signed
an opposing brief.
73 See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical
Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 480–81 (2009) (“[Coding of] the
Database has serious, but often unrecognized, implications for empirical legal
scholarship. . . . [R]ather than illuminate the workings of the Supreme Court, some
empirical findings may reflect the way the Database reports . . . [or codes] information.”).
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C. State Amicus Activity and Partisanship
1. Cosigners and Opponents
To what extent is AG amicus behavior observationally equivalent
to partisan amicus behavior? There are various ways researchers
might approach that question. For example, one might try to code the
substantive positions advanced by AG briefs as liberal or conserva-
tive, and then determine the partisan affiliation of the AGs who sign
each brief. The difficulty, of course, is devising a system for coding
substantive positions that is both valid and reliable.74
We opted to focus on the relationships among the AGs who
joined, and who opposed, briefs by other AGs. As noted in Part I, it is
increasingly rare for individual AGs to file briefs on their own; most
state amicus briefs are signed by two or more AGs. We wanted to
know whether the resulting coalitions of AGs represent clusters of
copartisans, or whether they are better explained by factors other than
partisanship. To that end, we examined the association between a par-
ticular state AG’s own partisan affiliation and the average partisan-
ship of the state AGs who explicitly opposed amicus briefs signed by
the original AG. We also examined the association between each
AG’s partisan affiliation and the average partisanship of the AGs who
joined amicus briefs signed by the original AG. If partisanship is an
important determinant of amicus activity, then one would expect a
strong negative relationship between the ideology of AGs opposing
each other and a strong positive relationship between the ideology of
AGs who cosign amicus briefs.
With the help of a research assistant, we used Internet searches to
determine the party affiliation for all of the AGs in our sample. That
task was straightforward for elected AGs.75 For those appointed by
74 For literature discussing the problems with efforts to code judicial decisions as
“liberal” or “conservative,” see Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in
the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 415 (2013)
(finding that the labeling of cases depended more on the preferences of the Court than on
the disposition of the case); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial
Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 776–78, 780–81 (2009) (explaining
the numerous variables involved in classifying a decision); Shapiro, supra note 73, at
480–81 (arguing that the coding of the Supreme Court Database can lead to inaccurate
legal empirical scholarship); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and
the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11–12 (noting that the
inconsistent nature of these classifications poses a significant problem in accurate coding).
75 There is one complication: A significant number of elected AGs are initially
appointed (usually by the governor) because their predecessor steps down in a nonelection
year. Many run for election in a later year, but some do not. Virginia, in particular, stands
out in this respect: The appointed AGs serve a brief interim term before being replaced by
an elected one. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-213 (2011). We used the party of the appointing
governor as a proxy for the partisanship of the interim AGs.
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the state governor (Alaska,76 Hawaii,77 New Hampshire,78 New
Jersey,79 and Wyoming80), we used the partisan affiliation of the gov-
ernor as a proxy for the partisanship of the AG. In Maine, the legisla-
ture appoints the AG.81 As it happens, all of the Maine AGs ran for
office either before or after their term as AG, so we used the political
affiliations revealed in those races. We were unable to get reliable
information on Tennessee AGs, who are appointed by the state
supreme court.82 We therefore exclude Tennessee AGs from our data
analysis.
FIGURE 5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDEOLOGY AND PARTISANSHIP OF AMICUS BRIEF










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Each data point is a state AG term observation (e.g., the AG of Illinois in the 2003 Term).
The data points have been coded to reflect partisanship.
Figure 5 plots the relevant data. The x-axis in both subplots gives
the partisanship of each state AG—coded as 0 for non-Republican83
and 1 for Republican. The y-axis of the left plot gives the standardized
76 The governor of Alaska appoints the head of each principal executive department.
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 39.05.020 (West 2015). The AG is the head of the Department of
Law. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.23.010 (West 2015).
77 The governor of Hawaii appoints the head of each principal executive department.
HAW. CONST. art. V, § 6. The AG is the head of the Department of the Attorney General.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 26-7 (West 2015).
78  N.H. CONST. art. XLVI.
79 N.J. CONST. art. V, § 4.
80 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-601 (2015).
81 ME. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
82 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
83 These “non-Republicans” are all Democrats, except for the Minnesota AGs who
belong to the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party.
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average fraction of Republicans among the AGs taking merits-brief
positions that are explicitly opposed to the merits-brief positions of
the state AG in question. The y-axis of the right plot gives the stan-
dardized average fraction of Republicans among the AGs taking
merits-brief positions that are explicitly in agreement with the merits-
brief positions of the AG in question. The standardization subtracts
the total fraction of Republican AGs serving in the Term in question
and divides by the sample standard deviation of the partisanship indi-
cator from that Term over the square root of the number of cosigners
(or opponents, depending on the subplot). This is simply a z-score. A
value greater than 1.96 on the y-axis implies that a state’s opponents
(left plot) or allies (right plot) were more Republican than would be
expected by chance. A value less than -1.96 on the y-axis implies that
a state’s opponents (left plot) or allies (right plot) were less
Republican than would be expected by chance. Values close to 0 are
consistent with opponents (left plot) and allies (right plot) being
drawn randomly from the distribution of state AGs during the Term in
question.
Figure 5 presents, at best, weak evidence that state AG amicus
activity is consistent with a theory of partisan motivations. As would
be expected under accounts of partisan-motivated AG behavior, we
see a negative relationship between AGs’ own partisanship and oppo-
nent partisanship and a positive relationship between own partisan-
ship and cosigner partisanship. However, the strength of these
relationships is weak, with average z-scores for both Democrats and
Republicans (the values on the y-axis of the regression line when AG
Partisanship is 0 and 1 respectively) well below 1.96 in absolute value.
Further, there are a number of state AGs whose amicus behavior goes
against a simple partisan interpretation. This can be seen by the
Democrat AGs in the left plot (and the Republican AGs in the right
plot) who have opponents (cosigners) who are much more likely to be
Democrats than would be expected by chance (i.e., have z-scores
below -1.96). Similarly, there are a number of Republican AGs in the
left plot (and Democratic AGs in the right plot) who have opponents
(cosigners) who are much more likely to be Republicans than would
be expected by chance (i.e., have z-scores above 1.96).
The conclusion to take from Figure 5 is that, on average, over the
entire period of study there are visible but statistically insignificant
relationships between an AG’s own partisanship and the partisanship
of brief opponents and joiners. This lack of statistically significant
relationships is not so surprising when one considers that Figure 5
pools data from nearly thirty-five years—years that, according to the
accounts cited above, featured a great deal of change in the role of
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state AGs. Figure 5 also pools data across forty-nine states, each with
its own unique characteristics. Our next step, then, is to disaggregate
these results by Term and state to determine if the aggregate results
are washing out statistically significant relationships within Term and
within state.
We begin by disaggregating the data by Term. If the weak associa-
tions seen in Figure 5 are simply artifacts of collapsing data from mul-
tiple Terms, then we should see stronger relationships within
individual Terms. Figure 6 presents results similar to those in Figure 5,
but on a Term-by-Term basis. A number of interesting patterns stand
out. First, prior to the 1995 Term, the regression lines in both the left
and right subplots are quite flat and never take values greater than
1.96 in absolute value. This is consistent with nonpartisan behavior
both among brief opponents and brief cosigners.
FIGURE 6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDEOLOGY AND PARTISANSHIP OF AMICUS BRIEF
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Notes:  Each data point is a state AG term observation (e.g., the AG of Illinois in the 2003
Term). The data points have been coded to reflect partisanship.
However, after the mid-1990s a different story emerges. Begin-
ning in 1995, the regression lines in the left subplot begin to take on
negative slopes for most of the remaining Terms. Looking more
closely at the post-1994 subplots on the left, we see that the average
partisanship of opponents of Democratic AGs is significantly more
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Republican than would be expected by chance in five Terms (1995,
2003, 2006, 2012, and 2013). In those same plots, the average partisan-
ship of opponents of Republicans is significantly more Democratic
than would be expected by chance in three Terms (2003, 2011, and
2013). Polarization among AGs in cases with opposing state briefs is
therefore a relatively recent phenomenon—certainly after 1994 and
even more heavily concentrated after the 2010 Term.
Looking at the partisanship of cosigners in the right subplot of
Figure 6 only confirms this conclusion. The slopes of the regression
lines are again fairly flat throughout the 1990s, indicating no strong
relationship between an AG’s own partisanship and the average parti-
sanship of cosigners. This changes through the 2000s as an AG’s
cosigners tend, on average, to more closely resemble the AG’s own
partisan affiliation. Interestingly, the patterns are different for
Democratic and Republican AGs. The average z-score for
Democratic AGs is never below -1.96, which means that the cosigners
of the average Democratic AG were never more Democratic than
would be expected by chance. Indeed, in one Term (2009) the average
z-score for Democratic AGs is actually greater than positive 1.96
(2.52), indicating that cosigners of Democratic AGs were actually
more Republican than would be expected by chance. Contrast the
Republican AGs and their cosigners. In seven Terms (2003, 2004,
2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013) the average partisanship of cosigners
of Republican AGs was more Republican than would be expected by
chance given the observed partisan mix of AGs sitting in a Term. Fur-
ther, there was never a Term in which the average Republican AG z-
score was less than -1.96, meaning that the average Republican AG
never had a group of cosigners who looked more Democratic than
would be expected by chance. Much of the increased partisan polari-
zation in AG behavior thus seems to be the result of Republican AGs
writing briefs for cases in which Republican AGs are unified on the
merits and Democratic AGs are reluctant to write at all. We will come
back to this point later, to better understand which types of cases fit
this pattern of unified Republican activity and Democratic inactivity.
Before turning to the cases, however, we disaggregate the results
of Figures 5 and 6 by state. Here, we are especially interested in the
patterns evident in states that alternate the partisan control of the
AG’s office. These states might provide some leverage on the role of
partisanship, since other time-invariant, state-level factors are held
constant.
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FIGURE 7. STATE-BY-STATE TIME SERIES OF PARTISANSHIP OF
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Notes: Each data point is a state AG term observation (e.g., the AG of Illinois in the 2003 Term).
The data points have been coded to reflect partisanship.
Figure 7 displays state-by-state time-series plots of the standard-
ized partisanship of merits-brief cosigners. Again, these are simply z-
scores. We do not display data on brief opponents because of the
extreme sparseness of the data when conditioning on both Term and
state. The pattern in Figure 7 is largely consistent with that in Figure 6:
State-level z-scores are generally less than 1.96 in absolute value until
the early 2000s when they begin taking on larger values—indicating
that in these later Terms cosigners tended to be more homogenously
partisan than would be expected by chance.
While some states with Democratic AGs tend to have average z-
scores below -1.96 during this later period (indicating increasingly
Democratic brief cosigners), this is limited to a handful of north-
eastern states: Connecticut, New York, and Vermont. Indeed, there
are more states with Democratic AGs that are trending in the other
direction—toward more Republican cosigners than would be
expected by chance. These states include: Kentucky, Louisiana,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-4\NYU407.txt unknown Seq: 26  2-OCT-15 14:01
1254 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1229
Montana, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The brief
cosigning behavior of the Democratic AGs of these six states in the
late 2000s and 2010s is more similar to that of Republican AGs than
other Democratic AGs. The relative conservatism of these states (as
measured in most any conventional way) suggests that partisanship by
itself might be much less important for AG behavior than the under-
lying political values of a state’s voters and politicians—including, but
not limited to, the AG.
If we focus on states that alternated partisan control of the AG’s
office, we see that the change in partisan control does little to affect
the partisanship of the state’s merits-brief allies. Note that before and
after a partisan transition, the z-scores remain relatively close to the
loess smooth that has been superimposed on each subplot. Again, this
suggests that partisanship, by itself, may be less important than state-
specific factors and more general trends at the national level.
2. Issues and Cases
Though partisanship appears to be ascendant in our set of amicus
briefs, there is still significant variation from Term to Term, and from
case to case within Terms. Some cases feature partisan coalitions;
others draw a bipartisan mix of AGs. What explains the difference?
Though we cannot answer that question conclusively with the existing
data, we can make some headway by examining the issues involved in
the cases with the most—and the least—partisan coalitions.
The first step is to calculate case-specific summary measures that
will allow us to focus on the cases that feature the most extreme polar-
ization and/or partisan behavior by state AGs. In essence, there are
two broad classes of cases: those in which opposing briefs were filed
by state AGs and those in which all briefs from state AGs were on the
same side. A look at the AGs on each side of the merits of the former
category can tell us something about the level of polarization in the
case in question. In the latter category of cases, without explicit disa-
greement on the merits, the partisan homogeneity of the participating
state AGs can indicate the partisanship of the group.
Our measure of case-specific polarization derived from the cases
with opposing state briefs is simply a two-sample z-test of the null
hypothesis that the fraction of Republican state AGs in each opposing
coalition is the same.84 Cases with statistically significant polarization
are those with z-scores greater than 1.96 in absolute value. The left
panel of Figure 8 provides information on the Supreme Court
84 These z-statistics are calculated with a correction for the fact that this is essentially a
sampling without replacement problem.
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Cases with Significant Partisanship
Notes:  The cases in the left panel are those that have polarization scores greater than 1.96 in
absolute value. These are cases that feature states filing opposing briefs in which the difference
in average partisanship between the two coalitions is more extreme than would be expected by
chance. The right panel features cases without opposing briefs in which the lone coalition was
more partisan than would be expected by chance. Cases with overly Democratic coalitions are
depicted with black; cases with overly Republican coalitions are depicted with dark gray.
Database issue areas for the cases with significant polarization. The
most prevalent issues in these cases are “economic activity,” “feder-
alism,” and “privacy.”
Our measure of case-specific partisanship is taken from the cases
without opposing briefs. Here, we tested the null hypothesis that the
fraction of Republican AGs writing or joining a brief is the same as
the fraction of Republican AGs serving in that Term. The tests used
were simple z-tests with an adjustment for sampling without replace-
ment. A z-statistic greater than 1.96 suggests that the briefing coali-
tion is more Republican than would be expected by chance, while a z-
statistic less than -1.96 suggests that more Democrats wrote or joined
briefs than we would expect under the null. The right panel of Figure 8
displays the number of cases with significant partisanship in each
direction.
Looking at this right-hand plot, the “criminal procedure” cate-
gory is particularly striking. To the extent that we see partisan coali-
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tions in such cases, those coalitions are overwhelmingly Republican in
their orientation. Criminal procedure cases are also largely absent
from the “opposition” subplot on the left. Though states filed a size-
able number of amicus briefs in such cases, we found opposing briefs
in only three cases. The first two were District of Columbia v. Heller85
and McDonald v. City of Chicago,86 both concerning the scope of the
right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. States squared off
over guns again in Abramski v. United States,87 dividing on the ques-
tion of whether a straw purchaser, who buys a firearm for someone
else, violates federal law prohibiting the making of false statements on
firearm purchase forms.
Putting the joining and opposing cases together, we can see that
Democratic AGs tend not to take partisan positions—positions we
might expect to favor criminal defendants—on conventional criminal
procedure issues. That finding might suggest that some state interests
(such as in crime control) are both commonly held and strong enough
to trump disagreements over policy, except in hot-button areas such as
the Second Amendment. Alternatively, the absence of opposition and
the strong Republican skew on criminal procedure briefs might reflect
the power of electoral politics. Even if Democratic AGs strongly
believe, for example, that the Fourth Amendment should not permit
warrantless searches of cell phones, they will not take a public stand
against law enforcement.
The “civil rights” and “first amendment” categories reveal similar
asymmetries between Democratic and Republican coalitions, though
the patterns are less stark. In both categories, Republican-slanted
coalitions account for two-thirds of the briefs that rank as significantly
partisan. Many of the Republican-dominated briefs respond to
Establishment Clause challenges to governmental practices such as
aid to religious schools and organizations,88 school prayer,89 and the
placement of religious symbols on public land.90 The others take up a
mix of issues, ranging from redistricting91 to qualified immunity92 to
85 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Somewhat surprisingly, the states’ briefs in Heller did not reflect
significant partisan polarization—an issue that we explore in more detail below.
86 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
87 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014).
88 E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (vouchers for religious
schools); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (use of school facilities
for religious purposes); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (aid to parochial schools).
89 E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (student-led, student-
initiated school prayer services).
90 E.g., Salazar v. Buono, 599 U.S. 700 (2010); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
91 E.g., Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008) (scope of the Voting Rights Act
preclearance requirement); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
(2006) (racial-gerrymandering challenge to a Texas redistricting plan).
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the scope of rights of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.93
Despite their variation, however, a common thread runs through all of
the Republican-dominated briefs: AGs are advancing arguments that
are consistent with their partisan orientation and with state power.
The tendency of Democrats to support more expansive individual
rights might help explain why we see relatively few Democrat-led
coalitions in these areas: The pro-individual rights position will often
mean less state power. The Democrat-dominated briefs focus over-
whelmingly on two issues—affirmative action94 and campaign
finance95—where it is common for Democrats to oppose claims of
individual rights. Thus, Democrat and Republican AGs alike seem to
seek out cases in which they are not forced to choose between their
preferred policy outcomes and the long-term institutional prerogatives
of the states they represent.
The cases in which states file opposing briefs are interesting,
therefore, because both sides cannot push for more state power.
Though states square off in civil rights and “first amendment” cases
with some frequency, only a handful of those cases involve sharply
polarized battles between state amici. That handful includes some
blockbusters: the famous challenge to the Virginia Military Institute’s
male-only admissions policy;96 McConnell v. FEC,97 involving a First
Amendment challenge to the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law;
and the recent Shelby County case concerning the constitutionality of
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act.98 The other two partisan-conflict
92 E.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (police officer’s immunity against a
claim of excessive force).
93 E.g., Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 480 (2006) (corporate
shareholder claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for a breach of contract between a third party
and a corporation); City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005)
(relationship between the private cause of action created by the Telecommunication Act of
1996 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
94 E.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (state university’s consideration of
race in the admissions process); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007) (racial classifications in student assignment plans for elementary and
high schools); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1986) (racial quotas for the selection
of new state trooper corporals).
95 E.g., Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (challenge to Montana
statute regulating corporate expenditures on behalf of candidates); Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230 (2006) (challenge to various provisions of Vermont’s Campaign Finance Reform
Act); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (spending
limits as applied to political parties).
96 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
97 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
98 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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cases involve free exercise challenges, which may pose special chal-
lenges for Republican AGs by pitting religion against state power.99
The cases coded as “privacy” involve similar clashes between
individual rights and state power. Most of those cases concerned abor-
tion;100 the exception is Romer v. Evans,101 a well-known case
involving gay rights, which prompted a partisan battle among state
amici. Hollingsworth v. Perry,102 though coded as a “judicial power”
case and ultimately resolved on standing grounds, likewise featured
warring AG briefs over the constitutionality of state-level bans on
same-sex marriage, as did United States v. Windsor (coded as “due
process”).103 In each case, one group of AGs (Democrats in Romer,
Hollingsworth, and the abortion cases; Republicans in Windsor) took
positions that cut against state power. Why? One possibility is that the
underlying issues are so salient that they trump abstract questions of
state authority. AGs might also feel comfortable taking positions that
limit states’ regulatory options if existing state law already is protec-
tive of the rights at issue. It is telling, in this respect, that all of the
AGs who signed the state brief defending the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) in Windsor hailed from states with constitutional provi-
sions or legislation consistent with the Act.104 Such behavior is consis-
tent with what Lynn Baker and Ernie Young have dubbed “horizontal
aggrandizement,” whereby states use federal power to lock in (and
impose on other states) policies they already favor.105
As noted above, the largest number of cases featuring interstate
conflict fall within the “economic activity” and “federalism” issue cat-
99 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010)
(free exercise challenge to public school’s policy of conditioning the use of school funds
and facilities on groups’ agreement to accept all comers); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712
(2004) (free exercise challenge to state law prohibiting the expenditure of public funds for
religious instruction).
100 For examples of abortion cases that generated opposing amicus briefs by partisan
coalitions of AGs, see McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (Massachusetts statute
mandating “buffer zone” around abortion provider facilities) and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000) (bans on partial-birth abortion).
101 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
102 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
103 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that a federal definition of marriage as between a
man and a woman violated equal protection).
104 Cf. Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122
HARV. L. REV. F. 108, 111 (2011) (“[A]ll the states that signed the McDonald amicus
brief . . . [arguing that the Second Amendment right to bear arms should be incorporated
against the states] already guarantee an ‘individual’ right to keep and bear arms in their
own constitutions, often in terms more expansive than those of the Second Amendment.”).
105 Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 110 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Blocher,
supra note 104, at 112 (offering a similar assessment of the state briefing in McDonald).
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egories. The federalism category is fairly straightforward and includes
many of the usual suspects, cases any law student could list as part of
the Rehnquist Court’s much-remarked “federalism revival.”106 States
squared off against each other in partisan coalitions in United States v.
Morrison,107 University of Alabama v. Garrett,108 Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs,109 and NFIB v. Sebelius.110 The feder-
alism category also includes preemption cases, though only one of
them, Arizona v. United States,111 generated a markedly partisan clash
between state briefs. In several other preemption cases, Democrat-
dominated coalitions of AGs defended state law without opposition
from other states.112
The “economic activity” category resists a simple summary. Many
cases in that category concern environmental regulation. Indeed, vir-
tually all of the cases in which states participated on one side only, and
in Republican-led coalitions, involved challenges to expansive envi-
ronmental regulations by federal agencies.113 Environmental issues
also provoked several partisan clashes between state amici.114
106 E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 431 (2002).
107 529 U.S. 598, 613, 627 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against Women Act
exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
108 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (testing the bounds of Congress’s power to legislate under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
109 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (same).
110 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that aspects of the Affordable Care Act exceeded
Congress’s power under the Commerce and Spending Clauses, but sustaining the
individual mandate as an exercise of the taxing power).
111 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (challenge to Arizona law regulating unlawful immigrants as
preempted by federal law).
112 E.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011) (holding that
federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, giving auto manufacturers the option of installing
either simple lap belts or lap-and-shoulder belts on rear inner seats, did not preempt state
tort claims); Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) (holding that state
statutes prohibiting grant recipients from using state funds to assist, promote, or deter
union organizing were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act under Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976)); Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (holding that state defective design claims were not preempted
despite federal approval under the Medical Device Amendments).
113 E.g., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (Clean Water Act); Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permitting program under the Clean Water Act); Alaska Dep’t of
Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant
Deterioration program); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687 (1995) (Endangered Species Act).
114 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (multistate suit
against interstate electrical corporations charged with contributing to the public nuisance
of global warming); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009) (challenge to
the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act); Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549
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Dormant Commerce Clause cases (which divide the states almost
by necessity) are also housed within the “economic activity” category.
Most involve challenges to discriminatory state taxes, and none fea-
tures a distinctly partisan division among the states.115 Another fre-
quent subject in the “economic activity” category is antitrust, a topic
that inspired several Democrat-dominated state coalitions116 and one
partisan clash of state amici.117 Democrat-dominated coalitions also
weighed in on issues related to civil litigation, including the relation-
ship between arbitration and class actions,118 pleading standards,119
and limitations on punitive damages.120
III
IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Partisanship has become a central theme in scholarship seeking to
understand the motivations of government actors. Earlier work
tended to assume, following Madison, that “[a]mbition [would]
counteract ambition”121—that government actors would reliably push
for more power for the institutions they represented, thereby checking
the power of other institutions.122 On that view, state representatives
could be relied upon to resist federal overreaching and to push back
U.S. 561 (2007) (challenge to the EPA’s ability to impose new restrictions pursuant to the
Clean Air Act); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (challenge to federal power
to regulate isolated wetlands under the Clean Water Act).
115 See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (challenge to North
Dakota tax on outside retailers); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985)
(challenge to Alabama statute imposing lower tax rate on domestic insurance companies
than out-of-state insurance companies); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609 (1981) (challenge to Montana tax on coal mined in the state).
116 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007)
(clarifying the meaning of predatory billing under federal antitrust law); Kansas v.
UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990) (holding AGs lack authority to sue as parens
patriae on behalf of indirect-purchaser consumers); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982) (horizontal price fixing by medical societies).
117 See Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(rejecting antitrust claims hinged to the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
118 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration
Act preempted a state law that rendered mandatory class-waiver provisions in arbitration
clauses unenforceable. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Partisan coalitions of AGs filed amicus briefs
on both sides of the case.
119 E.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
120 E.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
121 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
122 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2312–14 (2006) (describing this conventional wisdom).
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against unpopular federal initiatives with competing policies of their
own.123
More recent work has called into question the assumption that
government actors will devote themselves to such “empire-building,”
to borrow Daryl Levinson’s term.124 As Levinson has explained,
neither government officials nor their constituents have interests that
“correlate in any systematic way with the power . . . of government
institutions.”125 Of course, government actors will sometimes have
incentives to expand the scope of their institutions. But enhanced
power is rarely an end in itself, as opposed to a means to some other
end (such as enacting a certain policy, appealing to voters, etc.).126
This is where partisanship enters the picture: If the abstract goal
of institutional aggrandizement fails to spur official action, partisan
ambitions might do the job instead. Thus, Levinson and Rick Pildes
have argued that competition between the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government is fueled by contests between the
two dominant political parties, rather than by the formal separation of
powers.127
Building on Levinson and Pildes’s work, Jessica Bulman-Pozen
has offered a similar theory to explain vertical conflicts between the
state and federal governments. Partisanship, she argues, is a key
reason for state challenges to federal power and federal policy: “States
oppose federal policy because they are governed by individuals who
affiliate with a different political party than do those in charge at the
national level, not because they are states as such.”128 Bulman-Pozen
therefore rejects the view, reflected in earlier federalism law and liter-
ature, that state actors represent a distinct set of “state interests.”129
Given party politics, she explains, “state opposition need not be based
on something essentially ‘state’ rather than ‘national.’ Instead of rep-
resenting distinctively state interests against the distinctively national
interests of the federal government, states may participate in substan-
tive controversies that are national in scope.”130
123 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 940 (“[A] political dynamic of competing imperialists
is central to the law and theory of constitutional federalism. Even skeptics of the political
safeguards argument take for granted that the federal and state governments will battle for
power . . . .”).
124 Id. at 917.
125 Id. at 920.
126 Id.
127 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 122, at 2315.
128 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 6, at 1080.
129 Id. at 1080, 1090.
130 Id. at 1090; cf. Heather K. Gerken, Abandoning Bad Ideas and Disregarding Good
Ones for the Right Reasons: Reflections on a Festschrift, 48 TULSA L. REV. 535, 545 (2013)
(“All that federalism and localism need to get off the ground . . . is salient differences in
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The partisanship explanation has great intuitive appeal. As is well
known, today’s parties are remarkably polarized.131 In the absence of
meaningful overlap between the two dominant parties—“the most
conservative Democrat is now more liberal than the most liberal
Republican”—there is vanishingly little room for constructive bipar-
tisan partnerships and compromises.132 Instead, the relationship
between the parties is marked by conflict. Voters, moreover, increas-
ingly vote along party lines.133 Politicians who wish to distinguish
themselves have strong incentives to do so in partisan terms, i.e., as
Republicans or as Democrats. As one leading commentator put it,
“[p]olitics is partisan warfare: that is our world.”134 It makes sense, in
such a world, that government officials would rarely do battle with
their copartisans, but would instead funnel their energies into chal-
lenging policies associated with partisan opponents.
All of this suggests that we should see partisan formations across
our amicus brief data—we should see Democratic AGs challenging
administrative decisions by Republican-controlled federal agencies,
for example, with Republican AGs lining up to defend those agencies.
We do see those patterns, but only in recent years. In roughly 6% of
cases in which any state files an amicus brief, other states take a con-
trary position. In those cases, the opposing clusters of state AGs are
often (though not always) noticeably partisan. Perhaps more tellingly,
in the 94% of cases in which states participate as amici on only one
side of the dispute, the coalitions of joining AGs have become increas-
ingly partisan since 2000.
To be sure, partisan clusters do not necessarily prove that parti-
sanship provides the spur to action. A case with warring state briefs,
featuring three Republican AGs on one side and three Democratic
AGs on the other, might appear as a partisan conflict but in fact be a
regional one—say, between upriver and downriver states. Because we
did not attempt to control for other factors that might provoke AGs to
participate as amici, we cannot be sure that the partisan patterns we
opinion and lumpy residential patterns. . . . Under those conditions, decentralization can
further a national conversation even if interest groups and political parties are simply
running national fights through state and local sites.” (citation omitted)).
131 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 276 (2011) (“We have not
seen the intensity of political conflict and the radical separation between the two major
political parties that characterizes our age since the late nineteenth century.”).
132 Id. at 277.
133 See id. at 278 (describing the decline of “split-ticket voting”).
134 Id. at 277.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-4\NYU407.txt unknown Seq: 35  2-OCT-15 14:01
October 2015] LITIGATING STATE INTERESTS 1263
observe are in fact the result of partisan motivations as opposed to
other factors.135
That said, we are confident that at least some of the coalitions of
joining and opposing states do reflect AG partisanship. For example,
many of the cases in which the states squared off against each other
were highly salient; some were blockbusters. That we would see par-
tisan conflict in such cases is hardly surprising. They are big cases pre-
cisely because they involve controversial issues on which opinion is
sharply divided, often along partisan lines. Many of the decisions in
these cases were split five-to-four, with the Justices divided along sim-
ilar ideological dimensions.
It bears heavy emphasis, however, that cases like this are a rela-
tively small set. Just as it would be a mistake to conclude from the
Justices’ five-to-four votes that Supreme Court decisionmaking is
always (or even mostly) ideological, it would be a mistake to jump
from evidence of partisanship in a nonrandom sample of blockbuster
cases to the conclusion that AG amicus briefing is always (or even
mostly) a partisan endeavor. Our data show that, in many cases, AGs’
advocacy positions cannot be explained by partisanship. The problem
is not just that partisanship does not provide a full explanation—i.e.,
that AG behavior is consistent with partisan motivations, but we
cannot make the leap from correlation to causation.136 Instead, in the
sizeable group of cases in which AG coalitions are bipartisan, it
appears that some AGs are acting contrary to partisan motivations.
The high levels of bipartisan engagement serve as a reminder that
partisanship is only part of the story, and that partisan ambitions may
be trumped by other, cross-cutting, motivations. The briefing in
District of Columbia v. Heller137—concerning the individual right to
bear arms under the Second Amendment—is instructive in this
respect. The states filed warring amicus briefs in Heller, and though
there are some obvious partisan aspects to the joining coalitions (the
anti-gun brief was signed by Democratic AGs only), the association
falls shy of formal significance. Of the thirty-one AGs who signed the
pro-gun brief, fifteen were Democrats. And, notably, those
Democrats argued not only against the typical Democratic position on
guns, but also against state power: The pro-gun brief contended that
the Second Amendment created an individual right to bear arms that
135 We note that the same is true of Nolette’s study, described in Part I and discussed in
more detail below. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 85–99 and accompanying text (discussing criminal procedure, civil
rights, and “first amendment” cases, in which states’ briefs tend to be consistent with both
partisan and institutional motivations).
137 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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ought to be incorporated against the states.138 Why would so many
Democrats sign onto such a brief? The likely answer is that, even if
the individual AGs did not support gun rights, citizens (and perhaps
other government officials) in their states did.139 Virtually all of the
AGs on the pro-gun brief hailed from states in the West, Midwest, and
South—where support for gun rights typically is strongest.140 The
exceptions are Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, both of which had
Republican AGs at the time.
Yet, not all western, midwestern, or southern states joined the
pro-gun brief. For example, Arizona is absent from the brief, despite
being named by Guns & Ammo Magazine as the number-one state for
gun owners.141 Tennessee and North Carolina are also missing, though
they are ranked sixteenth and nineteenth in Guns & Ammo, respec-
tively.142 The Democratic AGs from those states stayed on the side-
lines of Heller. The unruly patterns among Democrats from pro-gun
states illustrate the complexity of the question: Neither simple parti-
sanship, nor empire-building, nor regionalism can explain why some
Democrats signed the briefs and others did not. Thus, while our find-
ings are consistent with the view that partisanship is a “key” reason
for federal-state conflict,143 they underline how much more work
there is to be done in understanding what drives state action and
advocacy.
138 See Brief of the States of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Respondent at 23
n.6, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) (“[A]mici States
submit that the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental and so is properly subject to
incorporation.”).
139 Roughly half the states on the pro-gun brief had Republican governors in 2008, and
twenty-one of them supported the Republican candidate in the 2008 Presidential Election.
It is notable, however, that two of the pro-gun states were strongly “blue” at the time: New
Mexico and Ohio were served by Democratic AGs, Democratic governors, and a majority
of voters in both states supported Obama in the 2008 election.
140 Michael O’Shea divides states between categories he labels the primary gun culture
(broadly supportive of gun rights) and the secondary gun culture (more restrictive), based
on a catalogue of state laws and voter preferences. The more restrictive states are clustered
in “highly urbanized coastal states and cities”; “the rest of the nation—Midwest, South,
and West” tends to be far more gun-friendly. Michael P. O’Shea, Federalism and the
Implementation of the Right to Arms, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 201, 209–13 (2008); see also id.
at 211–12 n.50 (“Every Western state qualifies as a primary gun culture state except
California . . . . So does every Midwestern state except Iowa[,] . . . Illinois and
Wisconsin . . . .”).




143 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 6, at 1080. Bulman-Pozen explicitly disavows any claim
that partisanship is the only motivation for state-federal conflict. Id. at 1081 n.7.
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Our findings are also broadly consistent with the results of Paul
Nolette’s recent study of state amicus briefs. Nolette finds an upward
trend in “horizontal conflicts” among the states during the Obama
Administration, but a closer examination of his results reveals that the
spike appears in 2013 alone.144 Our study suggests a trend of longer
duration, stemming from the early 2000s, but with significant variation
from year to year.145
Nolette defines “horizontal conflict” among the states to include
two kinds of cases: those in which states file warring amicus briefs; and
those in which states are only on one side, but the coalition of joining
AGs is more than 80% Republican or Democratic.146 Although both
types of conflicts increased in 2013, most of the action is in the second
category: The number of briefs filed by lopsided partisan coalitions
seems to have jumped from around fifteen to more than thirty in that
year.147 One must be cautious in drawing conclusions from those raw
numbers. Nolette’s study does not reveal how often particular AGs
cosigned briefs with AGs of the opposing party. Without that kind of
information, it is impossible to know whether the seemingly partisan
behavior that Nolette reports is being counterbalanced by bipartisan
behavior in other cases. That is exactly what the work in this Article
accomplishes, and over a longer time period. Our data and analysis
allow us to make stronger empirical claims and to better understand
exactly when state AG behavior became more partisan.
The increase in partisanship in the post-2000 coalitions is striking.
As we noted in the introduction, we suspect the increase reflects the
broader trend toward party polarization: The greater the ideological
divide between Democrats and Republicans, the harder it may be for
AGs from the two parties to come together on joint briefs. Given the
abundant evidence of the increasing polarization of elected officials
holding other offices,148 it would not be surprising if AGs were
becoming more polarized as well.
It may be a mistake, however, to equate AGs with other elected
officials. Different officials may experience partisan motivations in
144 Nolette, supra note 64, at 456 fig.2.
145 Another difference between the two studies is that Nolette examined merits briefs as
well as briefs filed at the certiorari stage, and he does not disaggregate the two categories.
146 Id. at 455.
147 Id. at 456 fig.2.
148 See, e.g., NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 1 (2006) (finding increasing
polarization of U.S. Senators and Representatives since the mid-1970s); Boris Shor &
Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 530, 546 (2011) (finding that most state legislatures have become increasingly
polarized in recent years with some state legislatures more polarized than Congress).
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different ways, and those motivations may or may not be counterbal-
anced by the competing imperatives of the officials’ institutional roles
and professional commitments.149 For example, the fact that AGs are
legal advocates may play a role in explaining our findings. The job of
the AG is not to present her own best answers to the Court, but to
represent the interests of the state. If state law embraces restrictive
abortion policies, for example, it would be challenging for the state
AG to advance a pro-choice argument on behalf of the state. Like
other amicus briefs, state briefs begin with a statement of the interests
of the amici, and they tend to emphasize state policies that support
their positions. Without such supportive policies—which depend on
state actors and institutions other than the AG—the asserted state
interest carries much less heft. This feature suggests that AGs may not
be able to give full vent to their partisan motivations.
Put somewhat differently—and as the Heller example suggests—
the partisanship that drives AG advocacy may not always (or only) be
the partisanship of the AG herself. It follows that we might expect to
see different behavior from a Democratic AG in an otherwise heavily
Republican state than from a Democratic AG in a resoundingly
“blue” state.150 And, as more states become more solidly “red” or
“blue,” we might expect AGs to act in an increasingly partisan
manner. Another way to explain our findings, then, is by reference to
a trend related to (but not the same as) polarization: the rise of one-
party rule in the states.151
Many important questions remain. Most obviously, our data do
not allow us to identify the factors that are motivating AGs to write
and join briefs in cases where the partisanship story does not fit. One
promising avenue for future research would be to engage in a closer
analysis of the substantive issues at play in state amicus briefs, and of
the positions taken by different AGs. Though federalism cases offer
an obvious starting point, other issue areas deserve attention as well.
149 Cf. Hills, supra note 22, at 1201 (stressing the importance of disaggregating different
types of state actors); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An
Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1906–09 (2014) (same).
150 Sarah Esty’s study of state briefing in four years’ worth of federalism cases is
particularly interesting in this regard. Esty found that certain measures of state ideology—
the governor’s party and the state’s presidential vote, but not the state’s AG party—were
associated with significant increases in the state’s likelihood of filing a profederalism brief
during the Obama Administration. Esty, supra note 66, at 17–18. She reasons that “[t]he
lack of significance of the Attorney General’s party . . . suggests that they may have less
control over the stances they take, or feel more constrained to act in a non-partisan
manner that represents the interest of the people or the will of their Governor.” Id. at 19.
151 See, e.g., Dan Balz, States of Polarization, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2013, at A1
(describing the trend toward one-party rule in the states); Nicholas Confessore, A National
Strategy Funds State Political Monopolies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, at A1 (same).
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For example, our study suggests that a substantial number of
cases of interstate conflict center on questions of individual rights.
Such cases warrant further inquiry, whether or not they involve inter-
state conflict. Here we see states attempting to influence federal con-
stitutional law and policy in areas that are not directly related their
institutional interests—i.e., the interests of states qua states. (A state
that files a pro-choice brief in an abortion case, for example, may be
defending its policy choices but is not defending its institutional pre-
rogatives in any obvious way.) Beyond partisanship, we know remark-
ably little about what motivates AGs to weigh in on questions of
abortion policy, equality, and the like.
Another possibility is to test the effects of salience. Studies of
interest-group amicus activity suggest that the extent of publicity sur-
rounding a case plays a significant role in the decision to participate as
amicus: “The more the media covers the Court’s decision to hear a
case, the greater the probability of a membership-based interest sub-
mitting an amicus brief in the case.”152 The idea is that groups that
depend on membership for financial support will select for cases that
are likely to be visible to members and prospective members, so that
they can publicize their lobbying efforts effectively.153 A similar
theory might apply to AGs, particularly those who face reelection or
anticipate running for higher office, and who depend on constituents
for political support. Viewed from this perspective, the high-profile
nature of many of the cases featuring interstate conflict is interesting.
Do AGs experience greater pressure to toe the party line in such
cases? Or does the causal arrow run in the other direction, with AGs
using high-profile cases as opportunities to score political points with
constituents?
Still another approach would be to examine more closely the
coalitions of joining states. If, as we have found, the patterns are not
always strongly partisan (particularly for Democratic AGs), what
explains them? Are they regional?154 Does the presence or absence of
a state solicitor general make a difference?155 Finally, future work
152 Thomas G. Hansford, Information Provision, Organizational Constraints, and the
Decision to Submit an Amicus Curiae Brief in a U.S. Supreme Court Case, 57 POL. RES. Q.
219, 226 (2004).
153 Id. at 222.
154 Waltenburg & Swinford performed cluster analysis of the states’ certiorari and merits
stage joining behavior from 1953–1989. They discovered some regional cohesion in two of
the four clusters of states, but struggled to explain the other two. WALTENBURG &
SWINFORD, supra note 26, at 72–74.
155 See Goelzhauser & Vouvalis, supra note 25, at 822–23, 830–31 (discussing the
growing number of state solicitors general and finding that the probability of the Court
granting review in a state-filed case is higher for states with solicitors general).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-4\NYU407.txt unknown Seq: 40  2-OCT-15 14:01
1268 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1229
might explore different aspects of partisanship, looking at the partisan
composition of other state institutions in addition to that of the AG
herself.
CONCLUSION
Our study of state amicus briefs indicates that partisanship sup-
plies, at best, a partial explanation for why AGs participate in
Supreme Court litigation as amici. News reports tend to focus on a
relatively small set of controversial cases. And in many of those cases,
AGs square off against each other in the familiar battle lines of par-
tisan conflict. When the cases featuring interstate conflict are put in
context, however—considered alongside the mass of other cases in
which AGs participate as amici—it becomes clear that they represent
only a small fraction of the total. In most cases, AGs’ amicus briefs are
not explicitly opposed by other state AGs. Until very recently, these
unopposed coalitions of brief signers were generally bipartisan, with
average partisanship similar to that of the population of state AGs
then serving. The coalitions of unopposed amici have begun to take on
more of a partisan hue in recent years, but most of the movement is
due to Republican AGs writing briefs that other Republicans support
and that Democratic AGs neither support nor oppose.
This reality is largely missing from anecdotal accounts of AG
behavior. Yet it serves as an important reminder of how little we know
about the various forces that spur state officials to action. Partisanship
surely is part of the story, but we have only begun to understand how
partisan ambitions might interact with other competing motivations.
